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In his memoir entitled Growing Up, Russell Baker describes
the experience of being raised during the Depression in a family
with no father or breadwinner. His father, a rural stonemason,
died in 1931, leaving behind some Sears Roebuck furniture, the
proceeds of a modest life insurance policy, three small children,
and a 33-year-old widow with no apparent prospects of employ-
ment. To keep most of her young family together, Baker's mother
gave up one infant for adoption and moved with her remaining
two children hundreds of miles to live under the roof of a more
prosperous relative. The Depression did not end for the Baker
family until nine years later, when Mrs. Baker took a second
husband-fortunately, one with a job.'
Though Baker's childhood was not exceptional by the standards
of the 1930s, it would seem highly unusual within less than a
generation. Few widows in the 1960s felt obliged to give up their
children or move in with distant relatives to maintain a tolerable
standard of living. In part, of course, their good fortune was due
to the unexpected prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s, which made
reasonably well-paying jobs plentiful. But it was also due in no
small measure to a political innovation of the Depression: the
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Social Security system. Under the Survivors Insurance portion of
Social Security, surviving dependents of steadily employed workers
were spared the material privation that was so common before
1940 among families deprived of their breadwinners.
Social Security brought about equally profound changes in the
lives of American workers surviving to old age. While at one time
most of these workers would have been expected to continue
working well past 65, or to be dependent or indigent if they
failed to do so, most 65-year-olds are today retired and living in
relative comfort. An occasional voice is raised to complain that
impersonal government programs have substituted for (though not
replaced) the tender care of families in looking after the elderly.
Most of us, however, including nearly all those past age 60, are
pleased to know that the elderly are largely spared the unhappy
choice of working or becoming dependent on affluent relatives.
In the absence of Old-Age insurance, many would probably face
this choice.
The Social Security Act,2 signed into law in 1935, was arguably
the most significant piece of domestic legislation passed in this
century. Its fiftieth anniversary in 1985 provided the occasion for
a number of conferences and commemorative events. One of the
most useful of these was a seminar series and conference in New
Haven, Connecticut organized as the Yale Project on Social
Security. Scholars in law, economics, sociology, and political
science were asked to examine the history and underlying
principles of social insurance in the United States. Several went
well beyond this charge to offer a thorough assessment of
alternatives to the current system.
The fruits of this research are gathered in a splendid new
book edited by Theodore R. Marmor and Jerry L. Mashaw, both
of Yale University.' For readers unfamiliar with Social Security
who are interested in its background and philosophy, the volume
provides a superb introduction. For others like myself, who are
already specialists in one or more aspects of the program, the
book contains at least a few essays that are likely to be both
unfamiliar and intriguing. Economists, for example, are generally
ignorant of the constitutional and political issues surrounding
Social Security. The papers in this volume by legal scholars and
2. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-
1397 (1982)).
3. SociAL Sp*cuiTrY: BEYOND ThIE RiiEroiuc oF CRisis (T. Marmor & J. Mashaw eds. 1988)
[hereinafter SociAL SECuRrrY].
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political scientists contain accessible and often fascinating surveys
of these issues.
The eight essays are organized in four sections. The first
section, containing three essays, considers the historical and legal
background of Social Security and the future economic prospects
of the system." The second, with two papers, analyzes the largest
Social Security program, Old-Age Insurance, as a leading player
in the nation's overall retirement system." The third, which also
contains two essays, examines two parts of Social Security that
were added twenty or more years after the 1935 Act: Disability
Insurance, introduced in 1956, and Medicare, enacted in 1965.6
The book contains no examination of unemployment compensa-
tion, another basic component of social insurance created under
the 1935 legislation; nor does it treat the federal-state public
assistance programs, Old-Age Assistance and Aid to Dependent
Children, established in the original Act.
The volume ends with a somewhat curious essay on the
ongoing "crisis" in welfare state programs in several West
European countries.' Although this piece is evidently intended to
shed some light on the broader dimensions of our debate over
social insurance, the controversies in Western Europe appear to
me largely unrelated to the ones discussed in the United States.
This should hardly be surprising, because Western European
countries spend a far greater share of their national income on
social welfare programs than the United States. Because many
programs in Europe provide services that are not offered under
government auspices in this country, much of the European
debate over social welfare policy will seem unfamiliar to most
Americans.
Although little in this last chapter is directly or even tangential-
ly related to the seven preceding chapters, the editors have
borrowed its language of "crisis" to give a title to the book and
a theme to their graceful introduction. In that introduction,
Marmor and Mashaw argue that public debate over Social
4. Ball, The Original Understanding on Social Security: Implications for Later Developments,
in id. at 17; Tobin, The Future of Social Security: One Economist's Assessment, in id. at 41; Cover,
Social Security and Constitutional Entitlement, in id. at 69.
5. Graetz, Retirement Security Policy: Toward a More Unified View, in id. at 91; Starr, Social
Security and the American Public Household, in id. at 119.
6. Mashaw, Disability Insurance in an Age of Retrenchment: The Politics of Implementing
Rights, in id. at 151; Marmor, Coping with a Creeping Crisis. Medicare at Twenty, in id. at 177.
7. Klein & O'Higgins, Defusing the Crisis of the Welfare State: A New Interpretation, in
id. at 203.
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Security during the past decade and a half has been conducted
in an atmosphere of near hysteria: "Our governmental institutions
fragment attention in an already diverse polity, making regular
incremental adjustment difficult and thoughtful reassessment
nearly impossible. . . . Thus those who want action, particularly
reductions in benefits, resort to cries of 'crisis' to prompt action."8
Slow economic growth and rapid price inflation of the 1970s and
1980s undeniably provided ammunition to critics of Social
Security, who have insisted that the Trust Funds are lurching
towards insolvency.'
I. Increased Security
Current policymaking in Social Security is a far cry from its
condition before 1975. Martha Derthick, in her influential study
of the political history of the program, has argued that from
1936 until about 1974, most critical decisions involving the
agenda and basic design of Social Security were left in the hands
of a comparatively small group of specialist "insiders."0 The
deliberations of this circle of lawmakers and administrators were
carried out beyond the glare of public scrutiny and well outside
the poisonous atmosphere of impending crisis.
Although the same characterization might apply to policy-
making in utility regulation, waste water management, and a
dozen other areas of government activity, the absence of public
participation in Social Security decisionmaking before 1975 must
strike many observers as odd. The program provides Americans
with an essential pillar of support in old age and offers them far
greater insurance against disability and early death than any that
8. Id. at 4.
9. For a collection of essays critical of Social Security and its financial prospects, see
Social Security: Continuing Crisis or Real Reform?, 3 CATO J. 393 (1983). The essays by Paul
Craig Roberts (Social Security: Myths and Realities, id. at 393), A. Haeworth Robertson (The
National Commission's Failure to Achieve Real Reform, id. at 403), Thomas J. DiLorenzo (A
Constitutionalist Approach to Social Security Reform, id. at 443), and Peter J. Ferrara (The Prospect
of Real Reform, id. at 604) suggest, explicitly or implicitly, that Social Security faces a
continuing series of financial crises even after the passage of the 1983 Social Security
Amendments. All these essayists favor replacing Social Security with a dramatically scaled-
back public program and greater reliance on private (albeit tax-subsidized) retirement
savings.
10. M. DET TCK, POLICYMAXING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY (1979). Since 1975, the number of
people actively involved in Social Security policymaking has widened, in large measure
because the public has become concerned about the solvency and long-term sustainability
of the program. See infra note 11.
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they are likely to purchase on their own. Yet for much of the
history of the program, the public, including the academic
community, has shown itself to be singularly incurious about the
basic nature and administrative details of the program. When the
public's attention has been drawn to Social Security, as it has
been repeatedly since 1975, it has always occurred in the context
of some short- or long-term "crisis" in the program that allegedly
imperils solvency." While I am skeptical that any of these "crises"
seriously threatened the pension or medical entitlements of even
a single beneficiary, the atmosphere of crisis has fundamentally
altered the nature of Social Security decisionmaking.
The main casualty of this increased attention has not been the
quality of policymaking in Social Security, but the confidence of
the public in the integrity of the system. Under the harsh light
of public scrutiny, Congress and the Executive seem as capable
of reaching sensible policy accommodation as they were when
crucial decisions were made or framed by well-informed insiders.
The major reforms in Old-Age and Survivors Insurance enacted
in 1977 and 1983 were arguably better conceived than many of
the reforms that preceded them in the 1960s and early 1970s,
when Social Security policymaking was the supposed province of
specialists. But as an aroused citizenry more closely examines
policymaking, the faith of the public in the program has been
shaken. Marmor and Mashaw cite statistics showing that confi-
11. Between 1975 and 1977, the long-term solvency of Social Security was threatened
by a combination of slow wage growth, rapid price inflation, and defects in the 1972 Social
Security amendments that caused excessive increases in the basic benefit entitlements of new
beneficiaries. The Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 StaL 1329
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), explicitly linked Social Security
benefits to price inflation for the first time. As a result, benefits rose rapidly in the mid-
1970s when inflation was high, even though tax revenues were rising slowly because of
recession and an unexpected drop in worker productivity. An error in the 1972
Amendments further exacerbated these problems by causing new benefit entitlements to rise
much faister than warranted, either by changes in the price level or changes in average
earnings levels. The Social Security Amendments of 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509
(codifid as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982)), eliminated the error in the indexing
formula and reduced the long-run solvency problem, but high inflation in the late 1970s
and severe recession in the early 1980s threatened the liquidity of the largest Social Security
program, Old Age and Survivors Insurance. The Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub.
L. No. 98-81, 97 Stat. 65 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (Supp. II1 1985)), restored the
liquidity and long-term solvency of Social Security, although the Medicare program
continues to face long-term funding problems. Both Social Security and Medicare currently
run large annual surpluses.
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dence in the survivability of the system, especially among younger
workers, has fallen sharply since the early 1970s. 2
Marmor and Mashaw believe, and the essays in this book
demonstrate, that the public's alarm has little empirical founda-
tion. The social insurance programs enjoy firm political support
and a solid basis in law. There is no economic reason to believe
that the country cannot continue to pay for programs that look
much like the present ones. The modifications that may someday
be needed to keep the programs solvent are comparatively
modest.
Why, then, the continuing public uneasiness? One reason is the
highly charged nature of recent debate. Hard economic times in
the 1970s and 1980s required for the first time a scaling-back of
Social Security promises."5 Although the actual reforms were
modest, the fact that they were needed at all appeared shocking
to a public accustomed to receiving only good news with its Social
Security checks. To influence the shape of reform, a tiny but
articulate minority opposed to social insurance sometimes exag-
gerated the scope of financing problems faced by Social Security.
Advocates of the program, with the opposite political aim,
exaggerated the threat posed by program opponents. The
resolution of the policy debate has strengthened my conviction
that the position of Social Security is politically unassailable. But
the heat and duration of the debate has apparently had the
opposite effect on the wider public, which might have believed
before 1975 that the legitimacy and permanence of the program
were beyond dispute.
12. Soctw. SEcuiriTY, supra note 3, at 6.
13. The Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982)), changed the indexing formula used to
calculate benefits, reducing benefits for workers reaching age 65 in 1982 and later years.
The Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-81, 97 Stat. 65 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1305 (Supp. III 1985)), changed a number of aspects of the program, scaling back
benefit obligations and increasing revenues. In the short run, benefits were cut by skipping
part of a cost-of-living adjustment, and revenues were raised by increasing the contribution
rate imposed on the self-employed and speeding up the implementation date of tax
increases that had already been scheduled under the 1977 Amendments. Part of Social
Security benefits were made taxable for the first time, and revenue from this additional tax
was deposited in the Social Security Trust Funds. In the long run, benefit obligations were
reduced by raising the normal retirement age from 65 to 67. This reform, which effectively
reduces monthly benefits by 12% to 13%. will be phased in for workers reaching age 65
between the years 2003 and 2025. In both 1977 and 1983, the fiscal integrity of the Social
Security system was restored through a combination of tax increases and benefit cutbacks.
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II. Historic and Legal Background
A. Beginnings of the System
Students of the program know that neither the legitimacy nor
the permanence of Social Security could be taken for granted
during its formative years. In the first major essay of the volume,
Robert M. Ball, former Commissioner of Social Security, provides
a lucid and informative description of the original understanding
of the program among men and women present at its creation. 4
The vision of the original architects, including Franklin Roosevelt,
probably was shared by only a minority of Americans in 1935.
Their ideal of social insurance incorporated a variety of elements,
including some borrowed from older systems in Europe and
others unique to the United States. Workers were to be insured
against the risk of wage loss under a compulsory program that
required contributions from both employees and their employers.
Benefits were to be independently financed using the earmarked
contributions of workers and employers, and they were to be paid
to insured workers meeting basic eligibility conditions, regardless
of the worker's financial need for benefits. Finally, a worker's
benefit entitlement and eligibility were to be determined on the
basis of his or her past covered earnings under the program.
Although Ball does not explicitly mention the fact, the pension
benefit formula has always been intentionally redistributive:
workers with low steady earnings have historically received
monthly pensions that replace a larger proportion of their lost
earnings than is the case with more highly paid workers.
Although these principles have been adhered to through
numerous revisions and extensions of Social Security, they have
not been retained without controversy. In the 1920s, much of the
public and many politicians would have preferred a simple flat-
rate pension for the elderly, to be paid out of general revenues.
The idea of subjecting Social Security and Medicare benefits to
a means test has also been suggested, sometimes forcefully, over
the years. However, the original architects surely were aware that
basing benefits on past covered earnings (and hence tax contribu-
tions) would create a powerful constituency for the preservation
of the system. Workers who made earmarked contributions to the
program for many years would be loath to see it abandoned or
14. SocuiL SEcuRny, supra note 3, at 17.
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substantially scaled back on the eve of their retirement. The
payment of benefits to retired workers with high unearned
income similarly has some notable effects. It assures that Social
Security will always have wide political support among the affluent
as well as the needy, and it eliminates the stigma that sometimes
accompanies a government benefit check. When Social Security
has been extended, as it was in 1956 to cover disability and again
in 1965 to cover hospital insurance for the aged and disabled,
many of the original principles of the New Deal planners have
been incorporated or only slightly modified. 5
B. Future of the System
In the second essay in the volume, James Tobin first examines
the economic rationale and future prospects of Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and then suggests an alternative program that
might accomplish many of the same goals with less political and
economic strain. As are all the essays contained in this book,
Tobin's chapter is lucidly written and persuasively argued. Tobin
notes that the Social Security system faces a long-term problem
in balancing contributions to the system with future benefits, and
that it faces a short-term problem of eroding public confidence.
The problems are intertwined, of course, and both are ultimately
due to the economic and demographic trends of recent years. A
sharp drop in labor productivity growth, which began in 1973,
and a sharp expected rise in the proportion of the population
older than age 65, after about 2010, have made the long-run
prospects of Social Security much less promising than was as-
sumed just fifteen years ago.
These trends have set the stage for an intergenerational conflict
of a type that was noticeably absent over the first four decades of
the program. The first small skirmish in this conflict was the fight
over the so-called "notch babies," born after 1916, many of whom
were given Social Security pensions below those of the immediate-
ly preceding generation as a result of amendments passed in
1977. The amendments were necessary to preserve the solvency
of Social Security, but pensioners born in 1917 and later years
are sometimes struck by the unfairness of a system under which
15. See, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1956, Ch. 836, Pub. L. No. 70-880, 70
Star. 807 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1982)); Social Security Amendments of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Star. 286 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1982)).
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they receive lower retirement benefits than earlier generations
even though they have made greater lifetime contributions.' 6 The
fact is, however, that a pensioner born in 1917 can still expect to
receive pension and medical insurance benefits that far exceed the
discounted value of past payroll tax contributions. Unless the
nation experiences a major turnaround in productivity growth or
birth rates, the wage earner born in 1960 or 1990 will not be
nearly so lucky.
Tobin's proposal for reform is based partly on earlier proposals
advanced by Michael Boskin, Laurence Kotlikoff, and John
Shoven.17 Tobin suggests that Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
should gradually move, over a period of two or three generations,
from an unfunded to a fully funded financing basis. Pension
benefits under the revamped system should be based directly on
contributions, with each worker under the fully mature system
receiving a rate of return that is tied to the government's cost of
borrowing. Some income redistribution would be retained in the
new system by allowing the federal government to make special
contributions to the pension accounts of workers suffering
unemployment or long spells of low-wage employment.
Tobin apparently prefers the alternative system because it
moves Social Security closer to a program of pure insurance and
because it makes explicit the long-term obligation of the system
(and, indirectly, the federal government) to deliver on its pension
promises. While I agree with Tobin's observation that his proposal
constitutes neither a liberal nor a conservative reform, I suspect
that its long-run effect would be to reduce the redistributive
tendency of the current system.
16. The 1977 amendments affected only the benefits paid to workers born in 1917
and later years. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(B) (1982). Workers born before 1917 were
permitted to continue drawing benefits calculated under the defective indexing procedure
introduced in 1972. As a result, some workers born in 1916 receive monthly benefit checks
that are substantially higher than those received by workers born in 1917 who had similar
earnings histories. This discrepancy is especially glaring for workers who delayed their
retirement until age 65 or later; it is insignificant for workers who retired at age 62, which
is now the most common age for workers to begin drawing Social Security benefits. Furor
over the issue continues to this day, although under present budget conditions neither
Congress nor the Administration is likely to do anything about it; proposed remedies for
the benefit inequity are too expensive. For a recent analysis of the "notch babies" problem,
see NATIONAL AcPADEmy oF SocIAL INSURANCE, TuE SOCL SECURr'Y BENEfiT Norcii: A STUDY
(1988).
17. Tobin, supra note 4, at 65 n.25 (robin draws upon Boskin, J. Kotlikoff, &
Shoven, Personal Security Accounts: A Proposal for Fundamental Reform (paper presented
to the National Commission of Social Security Reform, Aug. 1982, rev. version, Sept. 1985)).
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Redistribution under the present system takes many forms,
some of them so complicated that they are poorly understood
even by the men and women who first proposed them. On
balance, however, Social Security is the government's single most
important source of redistribution. Without it, there would be
comparatively little redistribution of money income from affluent
to less affluent American households. If the system were reformed
so that it essentially became an actuarially fair insurance plan, I
am doubtful that Congress would see its way to help poorer
families with quite the generosity it does today. If the program
were otherwise actuarially fair, departures from fairness would
have an explicit price that might require periodic justification.
The form of redistribution suggested by Tobin-extra contribu-
tions to the pension accounts of unemployed or low-wage
workers-could be interpreted by conservatives as a subsidy to
sloth and indigence, thus making it even more difficult to justify
the expense. Although most Americans do not object strongly to
generosity toward the less affluent aged and disabled, they have
traditionally been much less sympathetic toward redistribution to
working-age adults.
C. Constitutionality of the System
In a fascinating article, the late Robert M. Cover discusses the
constitutional status of Social Security. The legal status of the
program was at one time doubtful; in the same year that Social
Security was born, the Supreme Court invalidated part of the
Railroad Retirement Act and the National Industrial Recovery
Act.' Many observers believed Social Security would experience
the same fate. The reasons that it did not are succinctly described
in Cover's essay.9
Some major constitutional questions remain unanswered, howev-
er. One that especially interests Cover is the extent of property
rights that workers may be said to possess in their pensions. The
link between payroll contributions and benefit entitlements may
appear to create a strong presumptive claim, but courts have
18. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating
compulsory retirement and pension provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-485, 48 Stat. 1283 (1934)); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935) (invalidating industry codes of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No.
73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933)).
19. Cover, supra note 4, at 71-72.
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given the government broad flexibility to withhold or reduce
pensions when deemed necessary.0  Cover argues that this
flexibility has the paradoxical effect of making participants in
Social Security policy debates quite rigid. Potential beneficiaries
are fearful that promised benefits will be reduced arbitrarily, and
this tends to strengthen their resistance to even comparatively
modest reforms. If greater constitutional protection were extended
to protect the rights of workers in their pension benefits, the
politics of Social Security reform might be more flexible.
II. Old-Age and Survivors Programs
A. Tax Implications
Michael Graetz analyzes the Old-Age and Survivors program
as part of a wider set of programs and tax preferences aimed at
providing incomes to the aged. Although he concedes that Old-
Age and Survivors pensions might be somewhat redistributive in
themselves, he argues that the contributory mechanism used to
finance benefits is strongly regressive while the tax preferences for
private pensions, Individual Retirement Accounts, and other
retirement programs have perverse distributional consequences.
I have always been puzzled by attacks on Social Security based
on the alleged regressivity of its financing mechanism. The tax is
a constant proportion of earnings up to a relatively high annual
limit, but this tax pays for strongly progressive benefits. As noted
above, without this program, the federal government would
engage in relatively little redistribution of money income from
affluent to less affluent families. I suspect that the Medicare
program is even more redistributive than the other Social Security
programs. Taxes are based on a fixed proportion of earnings, but
benefits are determined solely on the basis of covered medical
expenses among the aged and disabled. These expenses are
largely uncorrelated with prior contributions.
Viewed as a package, Social Security, Medicare, and the taxes
that pay for them have the distributional consequences Graetz
evidently desires. While the financing mechanism could certainly
be made more progressive, no strong reason exists to justify the
belief that the overall package of taxes and benefits would be
20. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (upholding termination of old-
age benefits otherwise payable to alien who was deported for being Communist).
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made more redistributive as a result. If the tax package were
made more progressive, Congress might be spurred to make the
benefit schedule less progressive, leaving the net distributional
consequences of the program unaffected.
The tax preferences for retirement saving also receive unkind
treatment in Graetz's essay. Many of his objections to these
preferences stem from his apparent belief that Congress and the
public share his view that the principal goal of retirement policy
is to raise the incomes of the less affluent. This is doubtful.
Congress may be more interested in encouraging employers and
workers, regardless of their incomes, to set aside part of compen-
sation for consumption during retirement. Since the pension
contributions of employers do not immediately raise a worker's
capacity to pay taxes, these contributions are not taxed until they
are withdrawn by the worker at retirement. Although Graetz
would disagree, I believe that this is a perfectly defensible line of
reasoning.
B. Alternatives and Privatization
In the longest essay in the book, Paul Starr provides an
authoritative survey of private alternatives to the current system
and the economic arguments advanced in support of them.
Although not himself an economist, he gives a clear and accessible
interpretation of their implications for the federal budget and the
future economy. Starr makes the interesting observation that feast
rather than famine may offer the strongest political challenge to
the current Social Security system. In the coming two decades,
the Old-Age and Survivors program will accumulate several
trillion dollars of operating surpluses. These reserves could
provide an opportunity for policymakers to begin substituting a
private system for the current one. If Congress were to disman-
tle the present system, the sheer size of the Trust Fund reserve
would assure pensioners and workers near retirement age that
their benefits were not in serious jeopardy. Opposition to this
kind of reform would have to come from younger workers, who
would be asked, under a transition program, to finance the
retirement of their elders, and to save for their own retirement.
Only a minority of younger workers appears to understand this
simple logic, however.
414
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III. Essays Not Written
If this volume has a gap it is the failure to present the ideas
of a principled opponent, although these are briefly described in
the essays by Tobin and Starr. Opposition to Social Security arises
for two main reasons. The first is basically ideological. Many
conservative thinkers, such as Milton Friedman, regard compulso-
ry saving for old age and disability as an unwarranted intrusion
on human freedom."' While I do not share this view, it might be
useful for many readers to see the position clearly mapped out
in order to evaluate the claims of the authors in this volume, all
of whom are quite sympathetic to Social Security. Including such
an essay might also have induced the remaining authors to use
greater care in stating and defending their basic assumptions
about the ultimate goals of social policy and the proper role for
government in achieving them.
A second common objection to Social Security is the perception
that current wage earners pay heavily for a program whose
benefits are directed to pensioners who are arguably better off
than tax-paying workers and who contributed relatively little to
the program themselves. This complaint is not treated systemati-
cally in any of the essays. It is surprising in the 1980s to read a
book about Social Security that pays so little attention to the
intergenerational conflicts that the program engenders. While I
believe that the extent of this conflict is often wildly overblown,
a systematic treatment of this issue would have helped many
readers understand the wider social role of the retirement
programs.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the objections of its opponents and the
baseless fears of some of its supporters, Social Security is likely
to endure in something close to its present form for many years.
In light of this fact, the editors of this volume are surely justified
in calling for greater temperance in the policy debate. Readers
seeking temperance, as well as principled policy guidance, will
find it in these essays. ut courts ha
21. M. FRiEDmAN, CAPrrMA.sm AND FREEDOM 187-89 (1962).

